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Comment
A More Convenient Crime: Why States Must
Regulate Internet-Related Criminal
Activity Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will
be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and former commerce .... The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people,
and this internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.'
I. Introduction
Images of child pornography traded between co-workers.
2
A woman's life publicly threatened by an acquaintance. 3 A mi-
nor propositioned to engage in illicit sexual activity with an
older stranger.4 The states where these transactions occurred
had every right to prosecute the offenders to the highest extent
possible but for one thing. The incidents took place on the In-
ternet. As a result, the situation was transformed. The federal
government automatically assumed jurisdiction. A "common"
crime was instantly morphed into a travesty of interstate com-
merce - a situation that, if not handled by the federal govern-
ment, is claimed to have chilling and unconstitutional
ramifications which echo off of every corner of the Information
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
2. See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998).
3. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
4. See United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246 (D. Conn. 1997).
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Superhighway. All of this occurred while the state was left with
no way to protect its citizenry simply because the crime was not
committed in a personally confrontational manner, but rather
in the privacy of a home or office, a more convenient crime, if
you will.
The Information Age has brought with it an expansion of
criminal activity and a broadening of the exercise of the federal
commerce power. The states are gradually losing their collec-
tive grasp on perpetrators to the federal government solely be-
cause modern criminals utilize technology to commit
transgressions more quickly and inconspicuously than in previ-
ous times. This is clearly wrong. Technological advances
should not afford a rationalization for the usurpation of states'
rights to protect their citizenry from crime.5 Congress enforces
this usurpation by categorizing Internet communications as ar-
ticles of interstate commerce 6 warranting Congress' exclusive
regulation 7 via the Commerce Clause.8
The fact that Internet communications are articles of inter-
state commerce does not justify exclusive jurisdiction by the
federal government over all related offenses. States originally
were granted the power to enforce criminal statutes under the
Dormant Commerce Clause,9 and this power should be contin-
ued in light of the increased utilization of the Internet as a
criminal instrumentality.10
The concept of Internet activity subjecting individuals to ju-
risdiction in a state court system is already established in the
area of civil litigation." Using traditional due process12 notions
5. But see Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095
(1996); see also Kenneth D. Bassinger, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State
Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889 (1998).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 70-88.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 54-69.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 106-20.
10. Includes "any machinery, weapon, instrument, or tangible object that has
played a significant role in a crime." CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. FED.
GUIDELINES FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS 28 (1994).
11. For discussion, see, e.g., Brian Covotta, Personal Jurisdiction and the In-
ternet: An Introduction, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265 (1998).
12. " No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "No State shall.., deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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of "purposeful availment"13 and "minimum contacts,"14 it has
become reasonable that a person can expect to be "haled into
court"' 5 where the Internet communications (either via the
World Wide Web or electronic mail) were received. Through
long-arm statutes, 6 state civil courts nationwide have success-
fully litigated claims regarding Internet-based activity.' 7 This
philosophy should be applied to (and in some states continue to
be applied to) criminal liability, under the auspices of geo-
graphic jurisdiction subsections of state criminal procedure
law. 18
This article will advocate state jurisdiction over criminal
activity which takes place on the Internet under the proviso of
the Dormant Commerce Clause. This will be accomplished by
journeying through a logical progression from the birth of both
Congress' Commerce Power and the states' police power to their
evolutions through the years in the face of emerging computer
technology. Section II of this comment will briefly explain the
concepts of Internet crime in general 9 and the development of
the term "Information Superhighway."20 Section III will ex-
plain the definition of the articles of commerce under the Com-
merce Clause 2' and how Internet communications have received
such designation. 22 The subsequent case law, which stemmed
13. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
14. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
15. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
16. Various state legislative acts which provide for personal jurisdiction,
via substituted service of process, over persons or corporations which are
non-residents of the state and which voluntarily go into the state, directly or
by agent, or communicate with persons in the state for limited purposes, in
actions which concern claims relating to the performance or execution of
those purposes, e.g., transacting business in the state, contracting to supply
services or goods in the state, or selling goods outside the state when the
seller knows that the goods will be used or consumed in the state.
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKin-
ney 1997).
17. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161
(D. Conn. 1996).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw Art. 20 (McKinney 1997).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 29-47.
20. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-69.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 70-88.
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from this designation and struck down state related statutes,
will also be discussed in this section.23 In Section IV, the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause will be introduced, 24 and cases will be
presented which support the exercise of police power over In-
ternet crimes by the states in the face of earlier mentioned
Commerce Clause case law.25 The focus will be on federal and
state courts in New York in this section since the majority of the
Internet related criminal jurisdiction case law stems from this
area.26 These decisions will also be used to refute the federal
legislative intent behind the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,27
under which the federal government brings most of its com-
puter and Internet-related prosecutions. This article will then
conclude in Section V with a summary of the tenets set forth
throughout this comment and offer a prediction for the future of
Internet prosecutions. 28
II. A General Discussion About the Information
Superhighway and Cybercrime
A. Internet Crime: Different Instrumentality, Same Effect
Many individuals have offered definitions of the Internet,
and each definition incorporates a variety of unique aspects:
lack of boundaries, speed, interactivity, and connectivity,
among others. For legal uniformity however, both state and
federal courts follow the definition provided in American Civil
Liberties Union v. Reno.29
23. See infra text accompanying notes 89-105.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 106-32.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 126-28.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 145-213.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 133-46.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 214-30.
29. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997). These cases struck down provisions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 [CDA] which was codified as a sub-section of the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223. The Act was designed to avoid children's exposure to "inde-
cent material" on the Internet and was struck down due to:
the lack of legislative hearings;
the use of different forms for 'indecent';
the broad definition of indecent;
the heightened level of review because of the criminal nature of the statute;
the broad applicability of the statute to commercial and noncommercial
speech;
[Vol. 20:189
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The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a gi-
ant network that interconnects innumerable smaller groups of
linked computer networks. It is thus a network of networks ....
Many networks ... are connected to other networks, which are in
turn connected to other networks in a manner that permits each
computer in any network to communicate with computers on any
other network in the system. This global Web of linked networks
and computers is referred to as the Internet.30
The Internet has three main functions: messaging, infor-
mation, and entertainment.31 "Messaging" includes common
features such as electronic mail ("e-mail"), bulletin board serv-
ices, 32 and "real-time" conversations ("chats" 33).34 "Information"
encompasses all of the knowledge published digitally on the In-
ternet, in both audio and visual formats, designed to benefit
students, businesses, and any individuals in search of serv-
the failure of the government to consider less restrictive alternatives; and
unreliable affirmative defenses.
Child Online Protection Act, H.R. Rep. 105-775, 105th Cong. (1998). The Child
Online Protection Act was subsequently passed in 1998 by Congress, as 47 U.S.C.
§ 231, to amend § 223. See id. This amendment was designed to be more narrowly
tailored than its predecessor by including provisions for implementation of age ver-
ification protocols, application only to commercial web sites, and utilization of leg-
islative hearings, among others. See id. However, on February 1, 1999, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the same court as in ACLU v. Reno "I", granted
injunctive relief from the enforcement of the Act, which was originally slated for
November 29, 1998. This injunction, as in Reno I, was again due to content-based
restrictions on speech and excessive burdens on Internet users and businesses.
See ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. filed February 1, 1999) ("Reno I").
30. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
31. See DANNY GOODMAN, LIVING AT LIGHT SPEED: YOUR SURVIVAL GUIDE TO
LIFE ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 19-22 (Random House 1994).
32. "A fancy name for an electronic message system running on a microcom-
puter. Call up, leave messages, read messages. The system is like a physical bul-
letin board. That's where the name comes from. Some people call bulletin board
systems electronic mail systems." HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY
182 (10th ed. 1996).
33. A common name for a type of messaging done over a network, involving
short, usually one or two line messages sent from one node to another. Usu-
ally a chatting facility is RAM-resident, meaning it can be 'popped up' inside
an application program. Users are usually notified of an incoming chat by a
beep and a message at the bottom of their screens.
NEWTON, supra note 32, at 248.
34. See GOODMAN, supra note 31, at 20.
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ices. 35 "Entertainment" includes any music, videos, and games
available over the Internet for leisure purposes. 36
Although the Internet is an international phenomenon,
American users comprise the overwhelming majority of the
global online population.37 Neilsen Media reported that in
1999, thirty-five million households, or approximately ninety-
seven million people had Internet access. 38 This means that al-
most thirty-four percent of United States households have In-
ternet access. 39 This figure has doubled from fifty-eight million
users in September, 1997.40 Of all the states, California has
the highest Internet-using population, with 6.4 million people
over age sixteen accessing the Internet by September, 1997. 41
New York State ranks second with 3.7 million users. 42 To-
gether, California and New York accounted for fifty-eight per-
cent of the country's Internet users in 1997. 43 Sixty percent of
Internet users have utilized the World Wide Web to shop.4
35. See id. at 20-21.
36. See id. at 21-22.
37. The international total of Internet users is 171.25 million. The
demographics are broken down as follows:
Africa: 1.14 Million
Asia/Pacific: 27 Million
Europe: 40 Million
Middle East: .88 Million
Canada & U.S.: 92 Million
South America: 5.3 Million
CommerceNet Research Center, Knowledge - Internet Statistics (last visited Oct. 7,
1999) <http://www.commerce.net/research/stats/wwstats.html>.
38. See Nielsen Media Research, New Internet Population Estimate of 97.1
Millions, 36% of the Total U.S. Population (visited October 20, 1999) <http:fl
www.nielsenmedia.com/newsreleases/releases/1999/netratings2.html>.
39. See id.
40. See Nielsen Media Research, Number of Internet Users and Shoppers
Surges in United States and Canada (visited October 26, 1998) <http:ll
www.nielsenmedia.com/news/commnet2.html>.
41. See Nielsen Media Research, Florida Is Among Fastest-Growing Internet
States California Leads in Total Number of Internet Users (visited October 26,
1998) <http://www.nielsemnedia.com/news/commnet1.html>.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Nielsen Media Research, Women Shoppers Head to the Web in Force as
the Number of Internet Buyers Jumps 40% in Nine Months: New CommerceNet/
Nielsen Media Research Study Also Shows Internet Users Top 92 Million in the
U.S. and Canada (visited October 20, 1999) <http:www.nielsenmedia.comnew-
sreleases/releases/1999/commercenet.html>.
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With so many users accomplishing so many tasks online, it
was inevitable that a criminal element would infiltrate the sys-
tem. Experts have attempted to group the most common types
of crimes which may be perpetrated on the Internet, either in-
ternally by individuals with legitimate access to networks or ex-
ternally by unauthorized users. 45 Included in these groups of
computer crimes are "unauthorized use of computer-related as-
sets, introduction of fraudulent records or data into a computer
system, alteration or destruction of information or files, and
theft (by electronic means or otherwise) of money, financial in-
struments, property, services, or data."46 Regardless of the clas-
sifications made by information technology experts, Internet
crime has a less technical definition. Although there are crimes
that are exclusive to the Internet, some crimes are merely phys-
ical crimes thrust into a virtual world. Although the aforemen-
tioned are the most common types of computer crimes, many
other crimes may be accomplished online, including "theft,
fraud, larceny, extortion, embezzlement, espionage, tampering,
forgery, sabotage, piracy, smuggling, terrorism, pornography,
pedophilia, impersonation, invasion of privacy, assault - even
attempted murder."47 These are the crimes with which states
are most concerned, the "ordinary" crimes that target random
citizens. Internet crime is no longer a crime affecting only the
government, military computer networks, or the most complex
of corporations. Unsuspecting private individuals are being
shocked everyday as they become victimized by criminals using
the Internet and computers as new weapons.
B. The Internet as "The Information Superhighway"
The Internet is appropriately nicknamed "The Information
Superhighway." 4 "Early discussions about the Internet made
use of the highway metaphor to compare the effort needed to
wire America with that of paving America with interstate high-
ways, begun in the 1950s." 49 As with paved highways, the vir-
45. See LAURA E. QUARANTIELLO, CYBERCRIME: How TO PROTECT YOURSELF
FROM COMPUTER CRIMINALS 16 (Tiare Publications 1997).
46. Id.
47. QUARANTIELLO, supra note 45, at 12.
48. GOODMAN, supra note 31, at 1.
49. Id. at 2.
1999]
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tual highway is extrinsically worthless, as is money, which is
not extrinsically worth anything in comparison to its represen-
tation as currency. The significance of each highway is mea-
sured by what each accomplishes. One highway carries
tangible items, while the other carries intangible electronic
communications. Both modes encourage a proliferation of com-
mercial activity, relationships, and travel, all of which directly
affect the economy of the nation as a whole and those of its indi-
vidual states.50
Despite the similarities, distinctions between actual and
virtual highways are significant enough to demand notice by
the courts. Paved highways are governmentally-funded
projects, while the Internet's rapid expansion is due primarily
to private individuals and organizations. 5 1 Furthermore, paved
interstate highways connect main roads in contiguous states,
but the Information Superhighway connects not only major
thoroughfares, but "also provides access to the side streets and
driveways leading straight to our doors."52 Paved highways
have signs for exits giving direction to towns, and then users
are left to find their way to individual sites. However, Internet
users are not simply directed where to go, but are instead led
directly to web sites, requested information, or individual e-
mail addresses. 53 This intimate connection with the daily lives
of individuals should lessen the theory of federal stronghold
over the Internet and place more penal authority into the hands
of state governments.
III. Interstate Commerce Meets the Internet
A. The Origin of the Commerce Clause and Articles of
Interstate Commerce
The United States Congress is directly granted the power
"to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States."54 This Commerce Clause must always be read
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause,55 which
50. See id.
51. See id. at 3.
52. Id.
53. See GOODMAN, supra note 31.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 18.
196 [Vol. 20:189
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permits Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." 56
Not all powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause are spe-
cifically enumerated; rather "[t]he powers delegated are of two
classes: such as are expressly granted, and such as are implied,
as 'necessary and proper' to carry into execution the powers ex-
pressly enumerated."5 7
Although the power is not specific, there are three broad
areas of activities Congress can regulate under the Commerce
Clause.58 The clause is most often used to "regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce[,] . . .protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities,... [and] regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce."5 9 These are
hardly the clearest of guidelines. Anything, if argued persua-
sively, can become "an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce,"60 which would then transform the item, no matter how
innocuous, into something worthy of federal regulation.
"As a general rule, any article which has been recognized
by custom or law as a fit subject for barter or sale - particularly
if its manufacture has been made the subject of federal legisla-
tion and taxation - must be recognized as a legitimate subject of
commerce."61 In the past, this has covered the gamut of items
from railroad cars62 and ferries63 to natural gas, 64 milk,65 and
even minnows.6 6 The "article of interstate commerce" designa-
56. Id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 35 (1824).
57. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 35; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964); L.E. Service, Inc. v. State Lottery Comm'n of
Indiana, 646 N.E.2d 334, 344 (Ind. 1995).
58. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 122-32.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 15A AMERICAN JUR. 2D Commerce § 36 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
63. See, e.g., Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth, 114 U.S. 196 (1885).
64. See, e.g., Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co.,
58 N.E. 706 (Ind. 1900).
65. See, e.g., Milk Control Bd. of Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306
U.S. 346 (1939).
66. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
1999]
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tion is not necessarily a permanent or consistent one. 67 In fact,
items may be stripped of this label 68 or be engaged in interstate
commerce for only a limited purpose.69
B. Internet Communications as Articles of Interstate
Commerce
The Internet and its communications may be considered ar-
ticles of interstate commerce, based on the three main catego-
ries of interstate commerce over which Congress retains
jurisdiction. 70 First, the Internet may be considered an "instru-
mentalit[y] of interstate commerce." 71 As mentioned previously,
the Internet has been likened to a paved interstate highway,72
which has been an article of interstate commerce for decades.7 3
Just as highways assist in bringing products across borders for
sale in other regions, so does the Internet.
Additionally, courts are currently considering Internet
communications, such as any form of messaging,74 a "thing[ I in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities" 75 because of the technicalities in-
67. In view of the Supreme Court's refusal to fix an arbitrary rule as to
what constitutes commerce subject to the power of Congress,.... [tihere is a
possible conflict between earlier cases holding certain matters not to be sub-
jects of interstate commerce and later cases holding related matters to be
subjects of interstate commerce, although the earlier cases have not been
specifically overruled.
15A AMERICAN JUR. 2D Commerce § 36 (1976).
68. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175
(1995).
69. 15A AMERICAN JUR. 2D Commerce § 36 ("[W]hile advertising contracts en-
tered into with the publisher of periodicals which are circulated throughout the
country have been held not to constitute interstate commerce, national advertising
originating throughout the nation and offering products for sale on a national scale
has since been held to be interstate commerce." (discussing Times-Picayune Publ'g
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) and Lorain J. Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951)).
70. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 122-32.
71. Id.
72. See GOODMAN, supra note 31, at 2.
73. "[I]nterstate roads and railroads are indispensable 'instrumentalities' in
the carriage of persons and goods that move in interstate commerce." Alstate Con-
str. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 15 (1953) (discussing Overstreet v. Northshore
Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1943)).
74. See GOODMAN, supra note 31, at 20.
75. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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volved in electronic mail message distribution and web page
downloading. Due to the networked nature of Internet-accessi-
ble computers and a high priority for efficiency, any "communi-
cation sent over this redundant series of linked computers could
travel any of a number of routes to its destination."76 Internet
communications are structured to utilize packet switching com-
munication protocols, 77 which break messages down into pack-
ets78 thus maximizing the efficiency of the travel time.7 9
Because of this phenomenon, a message sent from one individ-
ual to another may travel one route, while a response to that
communication or any future communications will follow a com-
pletely different path, depending upon the amount of Internet
traffic at the time.80 These routes do not differentiate between
states. Because of this, an e-mail message sent from New York
may go through Connecticut before reaching its final destina-
tion in New Jersey, but if that message were to be re-sent, the
packets may travel through Maine or Delaware. The same
holds true for any message sent from one state resident to
another.81
Courts also have determined that Internet communications
substantially affect interstate commerce.8 2 Courts dealing with
this issue have opined that inconsistent regulation by the states
would have a chilling effect8 3 on commerce, in that commercial
76. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
77. Sending data in packets through a network to some remote location.
The data to be sent is subdivided into individual packets of data, each
packet having a unique identification and each packet carrying its own des-
tination address. This way each packet can go by a different route. The
packets may also arrive in a different order than how they were shipped.
The packet ID lets the data be reassembled in proper sequence. Packet
switching is a very efficient method of moving digital data around.
NEWTON, supra note 32, at 855.
78. "A bundle of data, usually in binary form, organized in a specific way for
transmission. Three principle elements are included in the packet: 1. Control in-
formation - destination, origin, length of packet, etc., 2. The data to be transmit-
ted, and 3. Error detection and correction bits." Id. at 854.
79. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Penn. 1997).
80. See id. at 831-32.
81. See id. at 832. But see United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd on other grounds, 162 F.3d 1149 (2d Cir. 1998), discussed
infra notes 148-154 and accompanying text.
82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
83. In constitutional law, any law or practice which has the effect of seri-
ously discouraging the exercise of a constitutional right .... The deterrent
1999]
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enterprises will resist expansion for fear of criminal liability in
any state.8 4 As a result, commerce (not only exclusively crimi-
nal activity) will be restrained, even in cases where "activities
[are] undertaken without a profit motive"8 5 because "many of
those users who are communicating for private, non-commercial
purposes.., by virtue of their Internet consumption,"8 6 via sub-
scriptions to Internet Service Providers that charge for Internet
access.8 7 This is a difficult concept to accept, however, because
"[t]his test, if taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a
'police power' over all aspects of American life."8 8
C. Court Opinions Declaring Internet Communications
Subject Only to Federal Regulation
The leading case advocating exclusive federal regulation is
American Library Ass'n v. Pataki,8 9 in which various organiza-
tions9° challenged a New York state statute regarding dissemi-
nation of indecent material to minors,91 based on facial
effect of governmental action that falls short of a direct prohibition against
the exercise of First Amendment rights. To constitute an impermissible
chilling effect the constrictive impact must arise from the present or future
exercise or threatened exercise of coercive power.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 240 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
84. See American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
85. Id. at 172 (discussing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1940)).
86. American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
87. See id. Such providers also include the plaintiffs in American Library
Ass'n, who are small scale access providers or bulletin board operators.
88. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
89. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); but see infra notes 172-76, 192 and ac-
companying text.
90. See American Library Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 161. Plaintiffs include "a
spectrum of individuals and organizations who use the Internet to communicate,
disseminate, display, and access a broad range of communications. All of the
plaintiffs communicate online both within and outside the State of New York, and
each plaintiffs communications are accessible from within and outside New York."
Id. Plaintiffs' business and non-profit enterprises include library associations,
bookstore trade organizations, literary, art, and software trade organizations, In-
ternet service providers, and civil liberty organizations, including the ACLU. See
id. at 161-62.
91. A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the
second degree when: ... [kinowing the character and content of the commu-
nication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sex-
ual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he
intentionally uses any computer communications system allowing the input,
200
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constitutional violations of the Commerce Clause and the First
Amendment.9 2 As the first court to consider Internet communi-
cations articles of commerce, 93 Judge Preska found that the
statute94 and its legislative intent 95 did not limit jurisdiction to
intrastate conduct.9 6 Consequently, New York State's regula-
tion of indecent material unconstitutionally interfered with the
free flow of interstate commerce.9 7 This case stereotypes all In-
ternet communications and users by presuming that an of-
fender has no way of knowing the geographic location of the
person with whom she is communicating.98
A more recent case, United States v. Kammersell,99 further
developed the American Library Ass'n decision and reinforced
the interstate nature of the Internet. The defendant in Kam-
mersell moved to dismiss his indictment 00 for making a threat-
ening communication over the Internet in violation of 18 U.S.C.
output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs
from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication
with a person who is a minor. Disseminating indecent material to minors in
the second degree is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.21(3) (McKinney 1997).
92. Although First Amendment free speech concerns are legitimate in the face
of Internet expansion and regulation, the issue far exceeds the scope of this com-
ment, although some issues are intertwined with Commerce Clause considera-
tions. For discussion, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 824 (1997); see also, e.g., James
V. Dobeus, Rating Internet Content and the Spectre of Government Regulation, 16
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 625 (1998).
93. See American Library Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 167 ("While no one should
lose sight of the inventiveness that has made this complex of resources available to
just about anyone, the innovativeness of the technology does not preclude the ap-
plication of traditional legal principles - provided that those principles are adapta-
ble to cyberspace.").
94. See id. at 169-70 ("[Tlhe Act does not import any restriction that the crimi-
nal communication must take place entirely within the State of New York. By its
terms, the Act applies to any communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits
within the prohibition and over which New York has the capacity to exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction.").
95. See id. at 170 ("Further, the legislative history of the Act clearly evidences
the legislators' understanding and intent that the Act would apply to communica-
tions between New York and parties outside the State, despite the occasional glib
references to the Act's 'intrastate' applicability.").
96. See id. at 171.
97. See id. at 172.
98. See American Library Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 170-72. But see infra text
accompanying notes 163-71.
99. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Utah 1998).
100. See id. at 1197.
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§ 875(c). 101 His contention that the federal court did not have
jurisdiction was based on an e-mail transmission from himself,
a Utah resident, to another Utah resident via the Internet Ser-
vice Provider America Online. The fact that both the defendant
and the victim were residents made it an entirely intrastate
communication, and Kammersell's argument 10 2 relied on the
Commerce Clause analysis provided in United States v. Lo-
pez.103 Kammersell argued that state criminal law is a more
appropriate vehicle for prosecution of the type of crime that was
committed. 10 4 Although the Kammersell court did not perform
an analysis of Internet communications as articles of interstate
commerce, it did say that a communication may be considered
commerce although its intrinsic nature is not commercial or
business related. 10 5
IV. Dormant Commerce Clause as a Means of Exercising
State Police Power Over Internet Crime
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Generally
The Dormant Commerce Clause 106 is the main precept on
which the states rely for exercising jurisdiction over criminal
activities within state borders. Pike v. Bruce Church10 7 provides
perhaps the most famous articulation of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, the question
101. "Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communica-
tion containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person
of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both." 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
102. See Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
103. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
104. See Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1200-01.
105. See id. at 1201.
106. The negative sweep of the Commerce Clause designed to restrict the
states' regulatory interference with interstate commerce. See American Library
Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); supra notes 86-98 and ac-
companying text.
107. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
[Vol. 20:189202
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/8
A MORE CONVENIENT CRIME
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.'0 8
State legislation will invariably be struck down in situa-
tions where the burdens placed on interstate commerce are eco-
nomically protectionist'0 9 in nature or when there is preemptive
federal regulation. 110 Nonetheless, a state's crimp on interstate
commerce does not automatically render the legislation void.
Rather, Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optome-
try"' concisely articulates the basic premise set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church,"2 that "a state law may not be struck down on
the mere showing that its administration affects interstate com-
merce in some way. 'State regulation, based on the police power
which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or op-
erate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally
stand."'113
The Federal Commerce Clause and states' limitations
under the Dormant Commerce Clause are not necessarily com-
peting interests. "It is perfectly settled, that an affirmative
grant of power to the United States does not, of itself, devest
[sic] the States of a like power.""14 Concurrency of legislation is
a well-known, and well-founded, concept in our predominantly
Federalist system.1 5 "All powers... not expressly exclusive, or
108. Id. at 142.
109. "Economic protectionism" is defined as "regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors." New
Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
110. Where "state law is displaced only 'to the extent that it actually conflicts
with Federal law.'" Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474,
476 (1996) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)).
111. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
112. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
113. Head, 374 U.S. at 428 (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960)).
114. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 35 (1824).
115. Federal jurisdiction should be asserted selectively based on such fac-
tors as the type of defendants reasonably believed to be involved and the
relative ability of the Federal and state authorities to investigate and prose-
cute. For example, the apparent involvement of organized crime figures or
the lack of effective local investigation because of the interstate features of
the crime could indicate that Federal action was appropriate .... Coopera-
tion and coordination between Federal and state officials should be utilized
1999] 203
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clearly exclusive in their nature, ought to be deemed concur-
rent. All implied powers are, of course, concurrent. " 116 This is
true especially in the area of criminal law. Even though Con-
gress has made an act criminal, the states are not necessarily
precluded from legislating in that area. 117
Under the dormant commerce power, the states exercise
their police power via criminal statutory schemes designed to
protect the health, safety and welfare of citizens."18 The states
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the crimi-
nal law." 9 Therefore, though incidental burdens may be placed
on interstate commerce during the course of enforcement, such
burdens may be both permitted and inevitable when a state leg-
islates in the name of the health and safety of its people. 20
United States v. Lopez' 21 is perhaps the most heavily relied
upon case pertaining to the struggle between state and federal
criminal jurisdiction. The case centered around the Gun Free
Schools Act of 1990,122 which made it a federal offense for any
individual to knowingly possess a gun in what he knew, or had
reason to believe, was a school zone. 123 Lopez argued that the
to ensure that the new murder-for-hire statute is used in appropriate cases
to assist the states rather than to allow the usurpation of significant cases
by Federal authorities that could be handled as well or better at the local
level.
United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584, 587-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd on other
grounds, 162 F.3d 1149 (2d Cir. 1998).
116. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 35 (1824).
117. See S. REP. No. 99-432 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, infra
at notes 118, 120 ("S. 2281, as reported by the Committee, is a consensus bill
aimed at deterring and punishing certain 'high-tech' crimes in a manner consistent
with the States' own criminal laws in this area.").
118. The police power of a state was designed to:
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of
the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity ...
Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one
than upon the other, but they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnec-
essary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little inconven-
ience as possible, the general good.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1884).
119. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
120. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1978).
121. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994).
123. See id.
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Act was an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause
and an overstepping of Congressional boundaries into the
States' exercise of police power. 124 The Government unsuccess-
fully argued that the presence of guns on school grounds lead to
violent crime on campus and a poor educational environment.
Therefore, the students learn less, which results in poor jobs,
and eventually, a depressed economy. 125 The majority dis-
agreed, 26 despite the Government's attempt to articulate this
tenuous connection between guns on school grounds and inter-
state commerce.1 27 The Court held, "to uphold the Govern-
ment's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States."'128
The argument articulated in Lopez provides an excellent
parallel for many criminal Internet communications. State reg-
ulation of the Internet raises fear of inconsistency from state to
state which, "taken to its most extreme, could paralyze the de-
velopment of the Internet altogether." 29 This, of course, is cer-
tainly the most extreme view. There are many forms of
Internet usage,1 30 and state regulation could never impact all of
them. Is there not an assumption (regardless of the state) that
denying access to a computer network and causing it to mal-
function or even crash would be a crime? 131 Furthermore, is it
124. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
125. See id. at 565.
126. See id. at 567.
127. See id. at 565.
128. Id. at 567.
129. American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
130. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
131. Generally, denial of service attacks [DoS attacks] bombard any networks
and peripherals that have contact with the Internet with extra traffic, crippling
them so that outside users (including customers of Internet Service Providers) can-
not utilize the service. Such deliberate attacks can wreak havoc in a network and
shut down operations across the board. Additionally, when Internet Service Prov-
iders are attacked, not only is the victim network disabled, but when a provider
has any number of customers, the customers (both private individuals and busi-
nesses) also suffer. See Jeff Downey, Can't Say No, PC MAGAzINE, Apr. 21, 1998, at
203. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(5) (West 1997) ("[klnowingly and without
permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services or denies or
causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user of a computer, com-
puter system, or computer network."). See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-456 (1997);
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not presumed per se illegal for a fifty-five year-old man to se-
duce a thirteen year-old girl, whether in real life or online, un-
less they are a married couple? 132 The relationship between
total federal regulation of the Internet and the prevention of a
chilling of all Internet commerce is as attenuated as the link in
Lopez between guns near a school and the economy of the entire
nation.
B. The Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act versus State
Jurisdiction Over Criminal Internet Activity via the
Dormant Commerce Clause
The thesis of this comment is not that states should be au-
thorized to regulate all Internet activity without any federal in-
volvement; rather, that states should have the authority to
preside over cases where there is a substantial vested interest
in protection of the state's citizenry. This authority may be as-
serted only by the state or together with the federal government
when the offenses involved can be concurrently prosecuted by
both the state and federal governments. 133 States should be em-
powered to retain jurisdiction when an element of a state crime
is present during an Internet communication, 34 regardless of
whether the state prosecutes alone or in conjunction with the
federal government. In fact, states should not be permitted to
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-252 (West 1994). These states have statutes
criminalizing DoS attacks.
132. See People v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 672, 685 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1998); see also infra notes 169-96 and accompanying text.
133. The notion of dual sovereignty is not a foreign one in criminal law and
may be utilized in the area of computer crimes. Double jeopardy does not attach
when a federal action is brought against a defendant already convicted in a state
for a violation of one of the state's laws. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) (double jeopardy principle not invoked when defendants were prosecuted
under state law for conspiring to injure or destroy the property of another and
subsequently under federal law for conspiring to destroy "coaxial repeater stations
and micro-wave towers" by using dynamite to destroy telephone facilities); People
v. Bryant, 699 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1998) (concurrent jurisdiction principles apply in
case of bank robbery where federal government prosecuted for bank robbery, use of
weapons to place people in jeopardy, conspiracy, and use and possession of weap-
ons and the state prosecuted for attempted murder of an on-duty police officer and
knowing possession of defaced firearms). This concept has also been extended to
successive prosecutions in multiple states. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82 (1985).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 159, 163-68.
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regulate or impose jurisdiction over all Internet activity,135 nor
do states want such a responsibility. States do not want to be-
come general "Internet police" because they have no vested in-
terest in crimes that have both causation and consequences that
take place outside their state borders.
The federal government has legislated in the area of com-
puter and Internet crime for more than a decade for two main
reasons: 1) the interstate nature or governmentally-related as-
pects of various computer-related crimes prompting exclusive
federal action; 136 and 2) the discrepancy in ability between the
state and federal sectors to prosecute technology-related crimes,
resulting in primarily federal prosecutions.' 37 In the Senate Re-
port 38 for the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,139 the Judiciary
Committee identified the crimes in which it has an interest and
chose not to pursue all computer-related offenses. The Report
specifically stated that the government "prefers instead to limit
Federal jurisdiction over computer crime to those cases in
which there is a compelling Federal interest, i.e., where com-
puters of the Federal government or certain financial institu-
tions are involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in
nature."' 40
The second factor, the discrepancy between state and fed-
eral ability to prosecute, was addressed in the Senate Report,
and the Committee discussed the opposing viewpoints. On one
hand, the Committee considered "that[ I because some States
lack comprehensive computer crime statutes of their own, the
Congress should enact as sweeping a federal statute as possible
so that no computer crime is potentially uncovered."' 4 ' This
idea was rejected, however, and a more reserved approach was
chosen. The Committee developed the Act instead, so that it
135. Taxation and gambling pose special problems that Congress is currently
wrestling with. For discussion see Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation of
Electronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691
(1998); John Edmund Hogan, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of Internet Gam-
bling Regulation, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 815 (1998).
136. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479.
137. See id. at 2.
138. See S. REP. No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
140. S. REP. No. 99-432, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 2479.
141. S. REP. No. 99-432, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479 (em-
phasis added).
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"strikes the appropriate balance between the Federal Govern-
ment's interest in computer crime and the interests and abili-
ties of the States to proscribe and punish such offenses."1 42
This balance is no longer at issue in today's criminal legal
system, and as such, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act cannot
legitimately be used by the federal government to assert juris-
diction over just any computer crime. The government would
rather "limit federal jurisdiction over computer crime to those
cases in which there is a compelling federal interest."1 43 The
federal government should limit itself to situations where com-
puters of the federal government or certain financial institu-
tions are involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in
nature. 4 4 The crime itself should be interstate in nature,
rather than a crime that only involves an interstate instrument
during the course of the crime's commission. "[Tihe manner in
which the communication facility operates does not determine
the outcome. In evaluating the assertion of federal jurisdiction,
the focus should be on the location of the communicating par-
ties." 145 This would reduce the number of federal prosecutions
significantly and allow states to prosecute crimes which they
prosecuted prior to the use of technology in criminal acts.
In addition to the number of crimes that can be turned over
to the states because of decreased federal interest, states now
also have the ability to investigate and prosecute Internet of-
fenses. Currently, all states except Vermont have penal stat-
utes specifically targeting computer crime, and prosecution of
technology crimes by state agencies has become more common-
place. 146 As a result, the lack of experience in technology-re-
lated prosecution is no longer a valid reason for the federal
government to retain exclusive possession of the right to pro-
ceed against such offenders. Based on the legislative statement
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the federal government
should rely on the Act only to assert jurisdiction in the very lim-
ited situation where a federal computer is affected. The two
142. Id. at 2.
143. S. REP. No. 99-432, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479.
144. See id. at 2.
145. United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584, 589 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See
discussion infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (Deering 1999); Thx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 33.01-.05 (West 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.1-.15 (Michie 1998).
208 [Vol. 20:189
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/8
A MORE CONVENIENT CRIME
main reasons stated in the legislative intent, including lack of
state resources and greater federal interest, are now moot.
Therefore, the states should satisfactorily rely upon the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause to prosecute Internet and computer re-
lated offenders.
C. New York State as a Model for State Jurisdiction
States are now able to successfully prosecute Internet-re-
lated crimes on their own, and the courts in New York are pav-
ing the way. The state that brought American Library Ass'n v.
Pataki to the forefront of Internet-related criminal law softened
the effect of the case since both federal district courts and state
supreme courts are now straying from the idea of exclusive fed-
eral dominion in this area. These courts currently acknowledge
that as computer and Internet technology expand, the federal
government's exclusive grip on regulation of related criminal
activity must be loosened. Therefore, the courts in New York
should be looked to as a model for future Internet prosecution.
The expansion of technology should take our present existence
and make it easier. However, the federal government, by deem-
ing most forms of modern technology interstate in nature, has
assumed control over crimes which otherwise would have been
completely within state jurisdiction. The New York courts are
now taking the rights of the state back into their own
courtrooms.
Ironically, a federal district court in the Southern District
of New York was the first to become aware of the potential prob-
lem with federal dominion over a case which, but for a techno-
logical facet, would be in state court. In United States v.
Paredes,147 the defendant appealed his indictment under the
federal murder-for-hire statute148 by questioning the interstate
147. 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd on other grounds, 162 F.3d 1149
(2d Cir. 1998); but see United States v. Stevens, 842 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(intent to have communication be interstate in nature is not necessary for federal
prosecution for criminal activities requiring interstate nexus).
148. See Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 585 (quoting in pertinent part):
Whoever ... uses or causes another (including the intended victim) to use
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a
murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United
States... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than ten
years, or both.
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nature of communications via a paging system.149 The district
court held that a statutory interstate nexus requirement was
not satisfied in this situation because the communications in
question between government agents and the defendant all took
place within the jurisdictional confines of New York State, 150 re-
gardless of the fact that the paging system has the capability of
locating individuals in other states.'5'
This holding is most relevant in situations where the send-
ing and receipt of Internet communications are solely intra-
state. However, Judge Scheindlin issued a broader statement
which is applicable to any offense which, but for the technology
used as an instrumentality, would have been an offense against
the state and not the federal government. 152 Judge Scheindlin
warned that if the current trend of technological evolution con-
tinues, the federal government would be able to prosecute types
of crimes from which it was barred in recent years, thus ex-
panding the jurisdiction of the federal government to surpass
that originally contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,
who feared an excessively centralized government.153
The spread of innovative interstate communications technology,
combined with this interpretation of the interstate nexus require-
ment, sweeps within the province of federal jurisdiction crimes
previously considered to be entirely local in nature. In enacting
§ 1958, [the Federal murder-for-hire statute], Congress's ex-
pressed intent was to provide a statutory mechanism for prosecut-
ing "crimes with interstate features." That a defendant who
never traveled from one state to another, conducted an interstate
transaction, or communicated across state lines could now be
prosecuted under this Act because of the evolution in communica-
tions technology runs against the grain of the statute's legislative
history. 154
Judge Scheindlin further stated that decisions such as
Paredes must always be decided mindful of both the precedent
18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1994).
149. See Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 586.
150. See id. at 590.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1994).
154. United States v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd on
other grounds, 162 F.3d 1149 (2d Cir. 1998).
210 [Vol. 20:189
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/8
A MORE CONVENIENT CRIME
regarding state police power as set forth in United States v. Lo-
pez,155 and the influx of modern technology's usage in both
peaceful and criminal endeavors. 15 6 In very insightful dicta, the
court noted that:
Intrastate communications have taken on an interstate quality
because of the means by which beepers, cellular phones, email
[sic] and telephones function. It is very likely that in the near
future all electronic forms of communication will be transmitted
across state lines regardless of the location of the communicating
parties. As the original role of federal criminal jurisdiction was
intended to be limited in nature, it is troubling to permit techno-
logical innovation to significantly expand its scope without a spe-
cific expression of Congressional intent. The weakest link in the
government's argument is its failure to set reasonable bounds on
federal criminal jurisdiction. Under the government's theory, an
email [sic] sent from the kitchen to the office down the road might
implicate federal jurisdiction simply because the electronic
message was transmitted from a computer in New York to a com-
puter in New Jersey before reaching its final destination. 157
With Paredes as a breakthrough, the state courts began to
preside over litigation of Internet related crimes via its author-
ity under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Although the In-
ternet has no geographic boundaries, 58 states like New York
have exercised, and should continue to successfully exercise, ju-
risdiction via criminal jurisdiction statutes because of the
states' interest, and in some cases, better ability, 5 9 to appre-
hend and prosecute Internet criminals who choose to commit
155. 514 U.s. 549 (1995).
156. See Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 589.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. This is of debate in the courts, however, as they struggle with the notion
of jurisdiction. In American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), Judge Preska stated, "Typically, states' jurisdictional limits are
related to geography; geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct on
the Internet." This directly contradicts the earlier decision in Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997), which, while discussing the fundamental differences between the
real and virtual worlds in terms of limiting access to certain web sites deemed
harmful to children, asserts that "[clyberspace undeniably reflects some form of
geography: chat rooms and Web sites, for example, exist at fixed 'locations' on the
Internet." Id. at 890.
159. Local officials may have a better rapport with local Internet Service
Providers and other investigatory resources because of their involvement with
community outreach programs or frequent assistance with investigations and
prosecutions.
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some element of an actual or attempted crime which has signifi-
cant ramifications affecting the citizenry of a state.
Although Paredes is most significant as a precedent for
New York courts in situations where both the criminal and the
victim are located in the same state, later New York case law
has also established jurisdictional sufficiency when the alleged
criminal activity has only one element - a cause, effect or intent
of either - within the boundaries of the state. Like many other
states, New York has several statutes encompassing Internet-
related crimes, including the most controversial pedophilia 160
and child pornography 161 statutes, the focus of the most signifi-
cant and recent Internet-related litigation.162 These statutes
are fundamentally based on two areas of New York's criminal
procedure law, one pertaining to general geographic jurisdiction
of offenses, 163 and one asserting jurisdiction over Internet and
computer related crimes. 64 Under New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law § 20.20, the state generally retains jurisdiction over
offenses in which:
(1) Conduct occurring within a state establishes an element
of the offense, an attempt, or a conspiracy to commit the
offense; 6 5 or
(2) no conduct occurred in the state, but the offense's result
was in-state, the effect was intended to be felt in the state,
or attempt of conspiracy was meant to be in-state; 166 or
(3) there was a crime of omission with effect in the state,
whether or not the offender is physically present in the
state. 67
Under § 20.60 "[a] person who causes by any means the use of a
computer or computer service in one jurisdiction from another
160. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20-.24 (McKinney 1997).
161. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00-.25 (McKinney 1997).
162. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.00-.50 (McKinney 1997) (identifying addi-
tional computer and Internet related statutes, i.e., unauthorized use of a com-
puter, unlawful duplication of computer related material, computer possession of
computer related material, computer tampering, and computer trespass).
163. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 20.20 (McKinney 1997).
164. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 20.60 (McKinney 1997).
165. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 20.20-.20(1) (McKinney 1997).
166. See § 20.20(2).
167. See § 20.20(3).
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jurisdiction is deemed to have personally used the computer or
computer service in each jurisdiction."168 This statute takes
computer and Internet crime out of the virtual world, and
places it in a tangible location.
One year after Paredes, People v. Barrows169 was decided in
Kings County, New York, upholding the indictment of James
Barrows. Barrows, a Connecticut resident, was indicted on one
count of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child 170
and two counts of first-degree attempted dissemination of inde-
cent material to minors, 17' after he used the Internet to arrange
a meeting with an undercover agent whom Barrows believed to
be a thirteen year-old girl.' 72 On appeal, the indictment was
upheld and the court directly rejected Barrow's contention that
the statute was a violation of the First Amendment 173 and the
Commerce Clause. 74
The Commerce Clause argument was rejected because the
defendant purposefully attempted to lure a child for sexual acts
within New York State.175 The Barrows court examined the
American Library Ass'n v. Pataki decision 176 and distinguished
the Barrows fact-pattern. In striking down a portion of the New
York Penal Law, the plaintiffs in American Library Ass'n did
168. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 20.60-.60(3) (McKinney 1997).
169. 664 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
170. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10 (McKinney 1997).
171. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.22 (McKinney 1997). This is only an attempt
crime since the recipient was not a minor, but an investigator posing as one.
172. See People v. Barrows, 664 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411-12 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1997). Defendant James Barrows, a Connecticut resident, aged 39, was a sub-
scriber of America Online, an Internet Service Provider, and used the screen name
(Internet alias) "Captain Jack." With this alias, he "met" "Tori 83," a male under-
cover agent posing as a thirteen year-old female, and sent "her" an instant
message asking her if she preferred "older men." The two engaged in several such
"real time" chats and also exchanged e-mail that had attachments containing ob-
scene images. The conversations were sexually explicit in nature, even though
Barrows frequently acknowledged that what he was engaging in was illegal. The
Internet contacts and a telephone call culminated in a meeting at a boat marina in
Brooklyn, New York, where Barrows was arrested. A search of his car resulted in
seizure of various pornographic magazines and computer diskettes, in addition to
various items that were revealed by Barrows to be used to tie up a sexual partner.
173. See id. at 412. The First Amendment free speech challenge was rejected
because "[sitates are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
174. See Barrows, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13.
175. See id.
176. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
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not challenge the portions of the statute which penalize those
who transmit obscene material to children or lure children for
sexual acts. 177 Instead, the plaintiffs only argued that the stat-
ute as it existed unconstitutionally subjected residents of other
states to New York State laws, even when these other residents
do not interact with any state residents. 178 This distinction
meant that the Barrows court was not compelled to follow
American Library Ass'n and could uphold Penal Law § 235.22
as constitutional under a Commerce Clause analysis. 79 New
York's police power ultimately prevailed. In the court's opinion,
"[tihe State of New York should have the power to punish any-
one who sends sexually explicit material over the Internet to a
minor in New York and then seeks to lure that child to perform
a sexual act within the State." 80 However, the regulation of In-
ternet communications alone would not have withstood the
court's scrutiny under the tenets established in American Li-
brary Ass'n. 18
The Barrows indictment led to a jury conviction which was
reversed in part on First Amendment grounds and Commerce
Clause violations.8 2 Count Seven, involving the defendant's
graphic descriptions of acts he desired to perform on the under-
cover agent and explicit instructions for acts the undercover
agent was to perform on herself, 8 3 was dismissed under a free
speech analysis. 84 The court felt that the suggestions made by
the defendant constituted "mere words" and "pure speech" and
was therefore subject to Reno. 85 This analysis rendered
§ 235.22 vague, as it has the potential to limit the speech be-
tween adults on the Internet, an article of interstate com-
merce.'8 6 The count was therefore dismissed and the statute
was deemed unconstitutional via a First Amendment and Com-
merce Clause analysis.
177. See American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); see also Barrows, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
178. See American Library Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
179. See Barrows, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See People v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1998).
183. See id. at 676.
184. See id. at 685.
185. See id.
186. See Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
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Count Eight, entering New York to engage in sexual activ-
ity with a minor, was also dismissed on First Amendment
grounds.'87 The court emphasized that although there were
First Amendment violations, the count was not in violation of
the Commerce Clause, and in fact "the constraints of [the] Com-
merce Clause do not apply."1 88 Barrows' purposeful act evinced
his intent to commit a sexual offense' 89 within the State of New
York' 90 under Article 130 of the Penal Law,' 9' so neither pre-
emption nor Commerce Clause/extraterritoriality 192 violations
existed. 193 "Defendant's repeated concerns that he would 'go to
jail' for engaging in such activity indicates that he was well
aware that what he was proposing to [the undercover agent]
was illegal, as well as immoral." 94
Even though Barrows' conviction under Counts Seven and
Eight were reversed, 195 the Commerce Clause violations were
hand-in-hand with the First Amendment violations. Despite
the reversal, Barrows is still significant under a Dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis. What has still survived is the proposi-
tion that states may regulate Internet activities in conformance
with their police power if they do not burden free speech while
doing so. The continued belief that Barrows was subjected to
New York laws based on his intentional targeting of a New
York citizen is chipping away at the credibility of American Li-
brary Ass'n v. Pataki. 96
187. See id. at 686.
188. Id. at 685-86.
189. "Had Tori 83 actually been a thirteen-year-old girl, the probable outcome
of Defendant's meeting with her requires little speculation." Barrows, 677
N.Y.S.2d at 681.
190. See id. at 685.
191. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00-.85 (McKinney 1997).
192. See Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
193. See id.
194. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
195. See Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 685. Count One was upheld for "Promoting
an Obscene Sexual Performance by a Child" under Penal Law § 263.10.
196. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See supra notes 89-98 and accompa-
nying text. Additionally, People v. Gilmour, 678 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
County 1998), distinguished itself from American Library Ass'n when it held that
the Internet is a satisfactory investigative tool within the parameters of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause. See id. at 441.
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People v. Lipsitz197 illustrates how New York State, using
an approach similar to those in Barrows and Paredes, mini-
mizes the interstate character of Internet communications for
prosecution of consumer fraud cases. 198 Lipsitz involved a con-
sumer fraud prosecution by the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. 99 In that case, Lipsitz utilized e-mail solicitations
for the online sale of magazine subscriptions and either never
delivered the subscriptions or began delivering them halfway
through the subscription period. 20 0 Lipsitz was convicted on an
in personam jurisdiction theory since he himself solicited the
sales from a business in Staten Island, New York,20' and uti-
lized "an independent 'host' source" to target New York
customers.202
By engaging in an in personam jurisdiction analysis of
"minimum contacts" paralleling other types of civil litigation,
the state maintained jurisdiction notwithstanding the Internet
communications. 20 3 The Lipsitz court held that "for Internet
consumer fraud claims, the Internet medium is essentially ir-
relevant, for the focus is primarily upon the location of the mes-
197. 663 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997).
198. In October 1998, Congress enacted "The Children's Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1998." This Act, designed to protect the identity and safety of chil-
dren who use the Internet, was drafted to permit the States' Attorney General,
under section 1305, in cases in which he or she
has reason to believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been
or is threatened or adversely affected by the engagement of any person in a
practice that violates any regulation of the Commission prescribed under
section 1303(b), the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on
behalf of the residents of the State in a district court of the United States of
appropriate jurisdiction, to -
(A) enjoin that practice;
(B) enforce compliance with the regulation;
(C) obtain damage, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of resi-
dents of the State; or
(D) obtain such other relief as the court may consider to be
appropriate."
H.R. CoNF. REP. 105-825, 105th Cong. (1998).
199. See Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (noting that New York's consumer pro-
tection laws are modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act and "are similar
to consumer fraud, deceptive sales practices and consumer protection law of other
states."). See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw Art. 22-A (McKinney 1998 & Supp.1999).
200. See Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 474.
203. Id.
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senger and whether the messenger delivered what was
purchased." 2 4 There, the court emphasized that the "entire en-
terprise was firmly based in New York State."205 In Paredes,
the court acknowledged that a paging system may be interstate
in nature at times, as is true with the Internet.2 6 However,
Lipsitz also acknowledged the intrastate nature of the Internet
when, in that case, there was a New York resident targeting
residents of the same state. 20 7
The court further held that actions brought by the New
York State Attorney General are not limited to prosecutions for
harm inflicted upon residents of New York State.208 Out-of-
state complainants victimized by New York State residents are
also offered recourse because the Attorney General has the au-
thority to "restrain illegal business practice by a local business
notwithstanding that these practices occur on the In-
ternet."20 9 In this respect, the concept of interstate commerce is
deemed irrelevant for consumer protection claims against a
New York State resident by the Attorney General.
The Lipsitz court analyzed how its decision impacts inter-
state commerce, given the designation of Internet communica-
tions as articles of interstate commerce by American Library
Ass'n v. Pataki,210 and it rejected any contention that the In-
ternet aspect of this case affected the decision. 211 The court ex-
amined the role of consumer protection laws as a regulator of
local businesses, not as a prosecutor of businesses which act
outside of the state borders, even in an indirect fashion. 21 2 By
looking at the case from this perspective, the court saw no dif-
ferent issues presented in the Lipsitz fact-pattern. 21 3
There is no compelling reason to find that local legal officials must
take a "hands off" approach just because a crook or con artist is
technologically sophisticated enough to sell on the Internet. Invo-
204. Id.
205. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
206. See Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 587-88.
207. See id.
208. See Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
209. Id.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 89-98.
211. See Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75.
212. See id. at 475.
213. See id.
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cation of "the Internet" is not the equivalent to a cry of "sanctu-
ary" upon a criminal's entry into a medieval church. It should be
sufficient that the laws sought to be applied, even if they might
tangentially implicate interstate commerce, are "media neutral"
and otherwise pass constitutional muster.214
The cases from New York State since American Library
Ass'n, including Paredes, Barrows, and Lipsitz, are defying the
federal government and giving jurisdictional power back to the
states. These courts do not let the particulars of technology de-
tract from the cases presented before them. There are actual
victims who, but for the modern criminal and his methods,
would not be in federal court.
V. Conclusion
Internet communications are labeled by the federal govern-
ment as articles of interstate commerce,215 and as such, must be
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 216 The In-
formation Superhighway is likened to a paved highway, 217
which is unquestionably regulated by the federal govern-
ment.218 However, the Information Superhighway offers valua-
ble distinctions 2 9 and blurs the analogy sufficiently to justify
reanalyzing the federal government's exclusive dominion and
control over the implementation of related penal laws and ensu-
ing prosecutions. Internet crime is only going to rise in the com-
ing years as technology becomes even more involved in our daily
lives. If the federal courts continue to claim exclusive jurisdic-
tion based on a Commerce Clause theory over any crime in
which the Internet is utilized, there will be a significant reduc-
tion in the prosecutorial ability of the states and a weakening of
their police power, leaving states virtually paralyzed as crimes
increasingly involve technology.
The federal government, at this point in time, is overstep-
ping the very authority it granted to itself. Congress stated in
214. Id.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 70-88.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
217. See supra notes and accompanying text at 48-50.
218. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act22° that the federal govern-
ment does not want to prosecute all computer crimes;221 rather
it is only interested in pursuing those that affect the govern-
ment specifically 222 for crimes where the state is unable to pros-
ecute because of a lack of resources. 223 This is no longer a
problem, 224 and yet, under a Commerce Clause theory, the fed-
eral government continues to pursue Internet criminals which
would otherwise be subject to state prosecutions. The federal
government must loosen its grasp, re-evaluate its rationale for
pursuing crimes of this nature, and permit states to prosecute
either alone or jointly with it.225 The states must be given lati-
tude under the Dormant Commerce Clause to develop their own
methods for exercising police power over Internet activities.
United States v. Paredes226 offers a valid warning of the
dangers of federal prosecution of technology-related crimes,227
and New York State provides a chain of cases 228 offering viable
solutions for state jurisdiction that comport with the Commerce
Clause and Due Process. In Paredes, a federal court realized
the flaws in the very statutes it is meant to enforce, 229 and it
was only a matter of time before state courts followed suit. This
trend may very well continue into the future, and in time, the
impact of American Library Ass'n will be lessened even more as
the states learn to more effectively utilize the Dormant Com-
merce Clause and the police power it confers.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with federal legisla-
tion. In fact, in certain situations, it is vital.230 However, tech-
nology is advancing so rapidly that if the federal government
continues to prosecute any crime with a technological aspect,
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 136, 140.
223. See supra text accompanying note 137.
224. See supra text accompanying note 146.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
226. 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see supra notes 147-57 and accompany-
ing text.
227. See supra text accompanying note 157.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 169-214.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
230. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, discussed supra at notes 136-40 and
accompanying text, which is designed primarily to protect computers belonging to
the federal government and financial institutions.
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and therefore interstate features, the states will have no police
power left. Consequently, the United States could become the
centralized society from which the colonists fled and upon which
the Framers reflected when they established a government com-
posed of federal and state systems. The line must be drawn
clearly before this occurs. States cannot lose police power while
a criminal commits crimes more conveniently and covertly
under the guise of a domain name or e-mail address.
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